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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Are the challenged patent claims, which claim 
particular isolated molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(“DNA”), eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
(i) where those isolated molecules are undisputedly 
“compositions of matter” which do not naturally occur, 
(ii) where those isolated molecules have new and 
significant utilities not found in nature, (iii) where 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has 
issued similar patents since at least 1984, (iv) where 
the PTO in 2001 issued Utility Guidelines after 
extensive notice and comment proceedings 
confirming that such isolated molecules are patent-
eligible as human-made inventions under § 101, 
(v) where significant investment and property rights 
have been created in biotechnology companies and 
products over the last 30 years based on the patent-
eligibility of such isolated molecules, and (vi) where 
no similar challenge to the patent-eligibility of such 
isolated molecules has been mounted in the United 
States, before or since this lawsuit (and thus no 
conflict is alleged or could exist)? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude 
that 19 of the 20 plaintiffs recruited to join this suit 
lacked standing because they either lacked any 
injury traceable to Myriad, or had failed to show any 
“controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality” 
because certain plaintiffs’ speculative intentions to 
practice the challenged patents at some unspecified 
time in the future did not “warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment” under MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)? 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
No parent or publicly held company owns 10% or 
more of the stock of respondent Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
or of the University of Utah Research Foundation. 
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
The petition should be denied, as neither question 
presented by petitioners merits this Court’s review.  
As to the first, “Are human genes patentable?”, that 
is not the question that was raised in or decided by 
the lower courts.  Rather, the question correctly 
answered by the Federal Circuit was whether 
particular isolated molecules of DNA, which were 
never available to the public until humans invented 
them, and whose utility is clear and unquestioned, 
were eligible for patenting as “compositions of matter” 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Federal Circuit’s 
affirmative answer to the question that was 
presented to it squared with almost 30 years of PTO 
practice, with 30 years of substantial investment and 
reliance by the biotechnology sector, with the PTO’s 
2001 Utility Guidelines, and with the overarching 
purpose of U.S. patent law, which is to make new and 
useful inventions available to the public in exchange 
for a limited period of exclusivity.   
The second question, a jurisdictional one, is not 
worthy of certiorari, either, and its presence only 
confirms that this case is a poor vehicle for 
addressing either question.  Petitioners are 20 
individuals and organizations recruited as plaintiffs 
by two public-interest law firms to challenge a few 
selected patent claims.  The Federal Circuit 
concluded that only one of the 20 plaintiffs had a 
sufficiently real and immediate dispute with the 
patentee Myriad Genetics, Inc. (“Myriad”) to satisfy 
the case-or-controversy requirement.  The Federal 
Circuit’s conclusion as to that one plaintiff is itself 
incorrect, and presents an antecedent jurisdictional 
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issue that would need to be resolved by this Court, 
thereby making this petition a poor vehicle for review. 
Despite the PTO’s long and consistent practice of 
allowing claims to isolated DNA molecules as patent-
eligible subject matter, and the establishment of a 
thriving biotechnology industry with human, 
agricultural, and industrial products and companies, 
this case is the first—and still only one—to challenge 
the patent-eligibility of such isolated molecules in the 
appellate courts.  Indeed, the entire human genome 
was published in 2001 (several years after the 1994 
and 1995 filing dates of the relevant patents), and in 
that light, claims to isolated human DNA molecules 
sought after that date face bars to patentability 
under other provisions of the Patent Act, including 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (non-obviousness).  Thus, the relevancy 
of this § 101 issue is ever diminishing with the 
expiration of existing patent terms, and will soon 
vanish.  Importantly, Myriad did not assert 
counterclaims of infringement against any of the 
plaintiff-petitioners. Consequently, the petitioners’ 
speculations about the precise exclusionary scope of 
Myriad’s patent claims are just that; they have never 
been tested in any adversary proceeding.  Finally, 
petitioners did not ask the Federal Circuit to rehear 
this case en banc.  Thus, even if this case did present 
the sort of important and recurring question meriting 
this Court’s consideration—and it does not—then it 
would better await a case unencumbered by 
substantial antecedent jurisdictional problems, 
where the exclusionary scope of the patent claims is 
tested rather than purely speculated, and where the 
full Federal Circuit is asked to consider the question 




A. Patents Directed To Isolated DNA Molecules 
As Compositions Of Matter Have Been 
Issued For Almost 30 Years 
Patent claims directed to isolated DNA molecules 
are not a new development; indeed, the challenged 
patents here were filed over sixteen years ago.  
Rather, the PTO has been issuing patents directed to 
isolated DNA molecules since the early 1980s.  See, 
e.g., Pet. App. 53a; id. at 80-81a (Moore, J., 
concurring-in-part).  One investigation calculated 
that during the past thirty years, the PTO has issued 
2,645 patents with claims directed to “isolated DNA.”  
C.A. App. 3710 (declaration of former Acting Director 
of the PTO and Acting Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Intellectual Property).  Another recent article 
concluded that the PTO has granted over 40,000 
patents to DNA-related subject matter.  See Eric J. 
Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 19, 40 (2010). 
Nor does this case present the first judicial 
challenge to DNA-related patent claims.  Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit addressed invalidity challenges under 
§§ 102, 103, and 112 (though not a patent-eligibility 
challenge under § 101) to DNA-related claims over 
twenty years ago in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
See Pet. App. 81a (Moore, J., concurring-in-part). 
Moreover, in 2001, consistent with its long-
standing practice, the PTO promulgated Utility 
Guidelines—after an extensive notice-and-comment 
process—setting forth its formal policy that “an 
inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a 
patent on the genetic composition isolated from its 
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natural state and processed through purifying steps 
that separate the gene from other molecules 
naturally associated with it.”  66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 
1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).  The guidelines further provide: 
A patent claim directed to an isolated and 
purified DNA molecule could cover, e.g., a 
gene excised from a natural chromosome or 
a synthesized DNA molecule. An isolated 
and purified DNA molecule that has the 
same sequence as a naturally occurring 
gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an 
excised gene is eligible for a patent as a 
composition of matter … because that DNA 
molecule does not occur in that isolated 
form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA 
preparations are eligible for patents 
because their purified state is different 
from the naturally occurring compound. 
Id.   
Over these 30-some years, the biotechnology 
industry has proven to be “among our most 
innovative,” Pet. App. 90a (Moore, J., concurring-in-
part), and the companies which have relied upon the 
steady understanding that isolated DNA molecules 
are patent-eligible have “made the reasonable 
decision to invest large amounts of time and money 
into the identification, isolation, and characterization 
of genes,” and in turn have developed a rich portfolio 
of advancements in human, agricultural, and 
industrial products.  Id.   
Accordingly, the patent-eligibility of isolated DNA 
molecules has been well established for decades. 
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B. The History Of This Case 
1. On May 12, 2009, the American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation (“ACLU”) and the Public Patent 
Foundation (“PPF”) filed a declaratory-judgment 
action on behalf of twenty recruited plaintiffs, 
alleging, among other things, that a few selected 
claims of the challenged patents are invalid under 
§ 101 for claiming subject matter ineligible for patent 
protection.  Pet. App. 242a.  The specifically 
challenged claims were hand-picked by plaintiffs’ 
counsel, who made clear that this suit was fueled by 
PPF’s desire to “just pick one case as our case” to 
make a generalized challenge against all patents 
covering similar subject matter.  C.A. App. A7387-88. 
The district-court proceedings focused on two 
principal issues: (1) Myriad’s motion to dismiss the 
declaratory-judgment suit for lack of a real and 
immediate case or controversy; and (2) the parties’ 
cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits. 
2. Myriad moved to dismiss this suit, arguing 
that seventeen of the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable 
controversy because Myriad never had any 
communications with them regarding the challenged 
patents.  See Pet. App. 22a.  As for the three 
remaining plaintiffs—Drs. Ostrer, Kazazian, and 
Ganguly—Myriad showed that any communications 
with them or their organizations occurred more than 
a decade before plaintiffs filed this action, and 
therefore were too stale to demonstrate a real and 
immediate controversy under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.  See id. at 20a-22a.  Myriad also 
showed that two prior cases concerning the 
challenged patents concluded more than ten years 
before commencement of this suit and did not involve 
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any named plaintiff, and so did not demonstrate a 
real and immediate controversy, either.  See id. at 
22a. 
Petitioners responded by submitting a collection of 
declarations from various plaintiffs.  Among them 
was a declaration from Dr. Ostrer, who at that time 
was the Director of NYU’s Molecular Genetics 
Laboratory.  See C.A. App. A2932.  Dr. Ostrer 
averred that his NYU laboratory “has all of the 
personnel, expertise, and facilities necessary to do 
various types of [BRCA1/2] sequencing,” and that his 
laboratory at NYU “could, and would . . . do full 
sequencing.”  Id. at A2936 ¶ 9.  Dr. Ostrer also stated 
that because of a collaborative-license offer that 
Myriad made to NYU in 1998 (id. at A2964-74), his 
laboratory has not provided clinical sequencing for 
fear that Myriad would assert the challenged patents.  
Id. at A2935 ¶ 7; A2934 ¶4.  Drs. Ganguly and 
Kazazian also submitted declarations in which they 
stated that if the challenged claims were invalidated, 
they would then consider whether to perform 
BRCA1/2 testing.  Id. at A2852 ¶ 11. 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss 
based on its view that MedImmune’s “all 
circumstances” test does not require a patentee to 
have taken any action toward any specific plaintiff.  
Pet. App. 283a.  Instead, the district court stated that 
only “some affirmative act by the [patentee] relating 
to enforcement of its patent rights,” regardless of to 
whom such enforcement is directed, suffices to 
establish a controversy for declaratory-judgment 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 280a.  The district court then 
concluded that based on Myriad’s activities occurring 
in the late 1990s (various licensing letters and two 
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lawsuits) there “is the widespread understanding 
that one may engage in [BRCA1/2] testing at the risk 
of being sued for infringement liability by Myriad.”  
Id. at 287a.  This conclusion was contrary to a record 
that showed widespread testing activities by 
numerous laboratories and scientists (including 
various named plaintiffs), without lawsuits. 
3. With Article III jurisdiction upheld by the 
district court, the parties presented cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the merits.  Plaintiffs sought 
summary judgment that certain method claims (not 
at issue in the petition) and composition-of-matter 
claims in the challenged patents were invalid under 
§ 101, and violated both the First Amendment and 
the Patent and Copyright Clause (Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8) of the U.S. Constitution.  Defendants asked 
the court to grant summary judgment that the claims 
were drawn to patent-eligible subject matter and not 
in violation of any constitutional provision.  
Following briefing and submission of numerous 
expert declarations by each party, the district court 
held that none of the composition claims covered 
patent-eligible subject matter. 
The district court’s opinion began by noting that 
the question presented by plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
composition claims was not “are human genes 
patentable,” but “whether the isolated DNA claimed 
by Myriad possesses ‘markedly different 
characteristics’ from a product of nature.”  Pet. App. 
214a.  The district court did not distinguish between 
the various categories of composition claims.  Instead, 
the court concluded that all such claims were invalid 
because “none of the structural and functional 
differences cited by Myriad” constitute a marked 
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difference between the native DNA and the claimed 
isolated DNA molecules.  Id. at 216a.  The district 
court focused heavily on the similarities (rather than 
differences) between native and isolated DNA, and 
gave dispositive weight to a DNA molecule’s 
nucleotide sequence:  “The preservation of this 
defining characteristic of DNA in its native and 
isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the 
challenged composition claims are directed to 
unpatentable products of nature.”  Id.  (Even this 
conclusion was scientifically incorrect, as the claimed 
isolated molecules have a different sequence after 
isolation, due to the breaking of covalent bonds.  See 
Pet. App. 45a-47a.) 
4. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s 
finding of declaratory-judgment jurisdiction, but only 
as to one of the 20 plaintiffs, Dr. Ostrer.  On the 
merits, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s holding that the composition-of-matter claims 
did not claim patent-eligible subject matter.  (The 
Court of Appeals also reversed the district court’s 
determination that one of Myriad’s method claims 
was not patent-eligible; because the method claims 
are not at issue in the petition, we do not mention 
them further.) 
 a. As to jurisdiction, the three-judge panel 
unanimously held that only “one Plaintiff, Dr. Ostrer, 
has established standing.”  Pet. App. 30a.  Based on 
Dr. Ostrer’s district-court declaration, which was not 
supplemented with live testimony or cross-
examination, the Federal Circuit noted that, by 
virtue of his employment at NYU, “Ostrer [] indicates 
that his lab has all the personnel, facilities, and 
expertise necessary to undertake clinical BRCA 
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testing.”  Id. at 23a.  The Federal Circuit also noted 
that Dr. Ostrer “seeks to undertake specific BRCA-
related activities,” id. at 33a, for which Myriad 
sought a “collaborative license requir[ing] NYU to 
make a payment to Myriad,” id. at 32a.  The Federal 
Circuit then held that Myriad’s decade-old offer to 
NYU of a collaborative license sufficed to establish a 
case or controversy with Dr. Ostrer, because: (1) “the 
relevant circumstances surrounding Myriad’s 
assertion of its patent rights have not changed,” id. at 
34a; and (2) Dr. Ostrer “remains in the same position 
with respect to his ability and his desire to provide 
BRCA testing as in the late 1990s,” id. at 35a.   
The Federal Circuit held that Drs. Ganguly and 
Kazazian had not demonstrated a case or controversy 
with Myriad, because their declarations amounted to 
‘“some day intentions’ [that] are insufficient to 
support an ‘actual or imminent’ injury for standing.”  
Id. at 34a.  The court then held that the remaining 
plaintiffs also had not shown a case or controversy 
with Myriad given the absence of any “affirmative 
acts by the patentee directed at specific Plaintiffs.” Id. 
at 38a-39a.  As the Federal Circuit explained: 
“Simply disagreeing with the existence of a patent or 
even suffering an attenuated, non-proximate, effect 
from the existence of a patent” does not suffice under 
this Court’s declaratory-judgment precedents.  Id. at 
39a. 
 b. On the merits, the panel concluded that 
the composition-of-matter claims were indeed patent-
eligible under § 101.  In the lead opinion, Judge 
Lourie began with the observation that “Plaintiffs’ 
challenge under § 101 [to] Myriad’s composition 
claims [is] directed to ‘isolated’ DNA molecules.”  Id. 
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at 40a.  Judge Lourie began by observing that “the 
parties … appear to agree that isolated DNAs are 
compositions of matter,” id. at 43a, and noted that 
“[i]t is undisputed that Myriad’s claimed isolated 
DNAs exist in a distinctive chemical form—as 
distinctive chemical molecules—from DNAs in the 
human body.”  Id. at 45a-46a.  Judge Lourie 
proceeded to catalogue a variety of differences 
between the claimed compositions and native DNA, 
including the facts that isolated DNA molecules: (1) 
are “free standing”; (2) are “synthesized” or have 
“chemically severed” backbones; and (3) have 
significantly fewer nucleotides than native DNA.  Id. 
at 46a.  In view of such differences, Judge Lourie 
explained that “human intervention in cleaving or 
synthesizing a portion of a native chromosomal DNA 
imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical 
identity from that possessed by native DNA.”  Id.  
Thus, “we conclude that the challenged claims to 
isolated DNAs, whether limited to cDNAs or not, are 
directed to patent-eligible subject matter.”  Id. at 43a. 
Judge Moore, concurring in the judgment, noted 
the lead opinion’s “thoughtful analysis of the 
scientific principles associated with the claims at 
issue,” id. at 67a, and, like Judge Lourie, recognized 
that “isolated DNA sequences [are] at issue in this 
case,” id. at 70a, not “human genes.”  Nonetheless, 
she offered a separate opinion on the issue.   
Judge Moore analyzed the composition claims 
according to three different categories.  First, 
addressing claims drawn to cDNA molecules, Judge 
Moore determined that such claims are patent 
eligible because, among other reasons, “cDNA 
sequences do not exist in nature,” cDNA molecules 
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“only contain[] the coding nucleotides,” and such 
molecules “can be used to express a protein in a cell 
which does not normally produce it.”  Id. at 73a. 
Turning next to claims covering isolated DNA 
molecules with short nucleotide sequences, Judge 
Moore reasoned that such claims are also patent-
eligible given their (1) different structural 
characteristics (e.g., different chemical bonds and 
nucleotide sequences) as compared to native DNA, id. 
at 74a-75a, and (2) different functional 
characteristics, such as the ability to be “used as 
primers in a diagnostic screening process” and “as the 
basis for probes.”  Id. at 76a.  Lastly, considering 
composition claims covering isolated DNA with 
longer nucleotide sequences, Judge Moore 
determined that these claims, too, are patent-eligible, 
given their structural differences from native DNA.  
Id. at 78a.  Judge Moore further explained that the 
patent-eligibility of these claims is confirmed by the 
PTO’s decade-long policy of granting patents on 
isolated DNA molecules, and the public’s settled 
expectations of patent-eligibility for such subject 
matter.  Id. at 80a-82a.   
Judge Bryson wrote a separate opinion, in which 
he agreed with the majority that the challenged 
claims drawn to cDNA molecules are patent-eligible.  
Id. at 94a.  Like the majority, Judge Bryson also 
viewed the specific dispute as whether “the process of 
isolating genetic material from a human DNA 
molecule makes the isolated genetic material a 
patentable invention.”  Id.  Also, like the majority, 
Judge Bryson noted that isolating DNA molecules 
results in a “material change made to those genes 
from their natural state.”  Id. at 98a.  Judge Bryson, 
however, placed significantly less weight on this 
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change than did the majority because, in his view, 
the change “is necessarily incidental to the extraction 
of the genes from the environment in which they are 
found.”  Id.  Judge Bryson also disagreed with the 
majority as to the factual import of severing covalent 
bonds.  Id. at 99a.  Accordingly, like the district court, 
he determined, based on his own evaluation of the 
similarities, that the non-cDNA composition claims 
were not “markedly different” from native DNA, and 
thus in his view not patent-eligible.  Id. at 100a-104a.   
c. After the Federal Circuit issued its opinion, 
both parties sought panel rehearing; neither side 
requested rehearing en banc.  Petitioners sought a 
rehearing concerning standing for plaintiffs other 
than Dr. Ostrer, and concerning the patent eligibility 
of the challenged composition claims.  The Federal 
Circuit denied the petition. 
Myriad sought rehearing based on events occurring 
after issuance of the Federal Circuit’s opinion.  In 
particular, Myriad learned, and petitioners confirmed, 
that Dr. Ostrer ceased his employment at NYU, 
effective August 29, 2011.  See Pltfs’ Answer to Dfts’ 
Pet. for Reh’g at 2.  Since that time, Dr. Ostrer has 
been employed by Montefiore Medical Center 
(“Montefiore”).  Id.  Accordingly, Myriad requested a 
rehearing to declare this action moot because 
whatever claim Dr. Ostrer had to standing depended 
upon the Myriad-NYU correspondence in 1998, and 
because there is no colorable claim (or evidence) of a 
Myriad-Montefiore controversy concerning the 




C. Corrections of Petitioners’ Misstatements of 
Fact and Law 
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 15.2, and in view of 
the factual background provided above, Myriad 
provides the following specific corrections to address 
petitioners’ misstatements of fact and law.  
1.  The first question posed by the petition bears 
no relation to the uncontroverted facts of this case.  
This case does not involve the question of whether 
“human genes” are patent-eligible.  Yet petitioners 
seek this Court’s review by making inflammatory, 
incorrect statements such as “[t]hrough its combined 
patents, Myriad claims ownership of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes of every American.”  Pet. 8.  These 
types of assertions have no foundation in the record, 
nor in scientific fact, yet they are replete throughout 
the petition.  The challenged patent claims do not 
cover “human genes,” contrary to petitioners’ 
attempts to recast the nature of this case.  See, e.g., 
Pet. i, 2-3, 6-7, 16-18.  Rather, the challenged claims 
are specifically drawn to compositions of matter 
covering isolated DNA molecules that do not 
naturally exist.  In fact, every judge to consider the 
challenged claims has made clear that the claims 
cover ‘“isolated’ DNA molecules,” not human genes.  
Pet. App. 40a (majority opinion); id. at 62a 
(concurring opinion); id. at 94a (dissenting opinion); 
id. at 179a (district-court opinion). 
2. The claimed isolated DNA molecules are not 
“products of nature,” nor do they “exist naturally in 
the body.”  Pet. 5.  The specifications of the 
challenged patents teach that isolated DNA 
molecules are not naturally occurring; rather, they 
are “substantially separated from other cellular 
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components which naturally accompany a native 
human sequence or protein, e.g., ribosomes, 
polymerases, many other human genome sequences 
and proteins.”  See, e.g., C.A. App. A597 at col. 19, ll. 
8-18.  Thus, isolated DNA molecules “embrace[] a 
nucleic acid sequence or protein which has been 
removed from its naturally occurring environment, 
and include[] recombinant or cloned DNA isolates 
and chemically synthesized analogs or analogs 
biologically synthesized by heterologous systems.”  Id.  
As Judge Lourie explained in his lead opinion:  “It is 
undisputed that Myriad’s claimed isolated DNAs 
exist in a distinctive chemical form—as distinctive 
chemical molecules—from DNAs in the human body,” 
because “human intervention in cleaving or 
synthesizing a portion of a native chromosomal DNA 
imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical 
identity from that possessed by native DNA.”  Pet. 
App. 45a-46a.  Further, contrary to petitioners’ 
belated factual claim that covalent bonds of DNA 
molecules may be “formed and broken in the body” 
(Pet. 13), DNA cannot, in fact, be isolated in the body.  
By definition, isolated DNA is that which is excised 
and separated from its native environment; such a 
process does not naturally occur.  This scientific 
principle is well-supported in the record, as shown in 
the declarations of Drs. Mark Kay, Joseph 
Schlessinger, and Nancy Linck, among others.  C.A. 
App. A4291 ¶ 17, A4322 ¶ 133, A4324 ¶ 137, A4325 
¶ 143, A4412 ¶¶ 47-48, A4413-14 ¶¶ 51-53; A4723 
¶ 11.  Even the petition ultimately acknowledges this 
fact.  See Pet. 4. 
3. Contrary to petitioner’s claims (e.g., Pet. 3, 5), 
significant structural and functional differences exist 
between naturally-occurring DNA and the isolated 
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DNA molecules covered by the challenged claims.  
Judge Lourie’s majority opinion surveyed the 
structural differences between natural DNA and the 
claimed isolated DNA molecules, identifying 
differences such as chemically-severed backbones, 
significantly fewer nucleotides, and the free-standing 
nature of isolated DNA molecules as compared to 
natural DNA.  In the concurring opinion, Judge 
Moore likewise canvassed various structural and 
functional differences between natural DNA and 
isolated DNA molecules, including “change[s] in 
chemical bonds,” “substantially smaller molecule[s],” 
“distinctly different sequence of nucleotides,” and 
ability of isolated DNA molecules to be “used as 
primers in diagnostic screening procedures” and “as 
the basis for probes.”  Pet. App. 71a-72a, 76a.  Indeed, 
even the dissenting opinion, though assigning less 
legal weight to such differences, noted that there is a 
“material change” between natural DNA and the 
claimed isolated DNA molecules.  Id. at 98a.  And, 
the record reflects a number of submissions by 
experts detailing the differences in structure, 
function, and utility between isolated DNA molecules 
and native, or genomic DNA in the body.  See, e.g., 
C.A. App. A4320-35, A4335-39 (declaration of 
Stanford University School of Medicine Professor Dr. 
Kay); A4410-12 ¶¶ 44-48 (declaration of Dr. Linck); 
A4723 & A4728-29 (declaration of Chairman of 
Pharmacology Department at Yale University School 
of Medicine Dr. Schlessinger). 
4. Petitioners wrongly accuse the lead and 
concurring opinions of “depart[ing]” from this Court’s 
precedent in assessing patent eligibility.  Pet. 25-30.  
To the contrary, both Judges Lourie and Moore 
applied the same test petitioners urged on the lower 
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courts, i.e., whether a claimed invention is “markedly 
different” or “distinctive” from what exists in nature 
unaltered by the human inventive hand.  Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).  See Pet. App. 
45a; id. at 74a-77a.  Similarly, petitioners incorrectly 
state that the Federal Circuit adopted a “new and 
inflexible rule” regarding declaratory-judgment 
jurisdiction.  Pet. i.  Rather, the Federal Circuit 
plainly analyzed the standing issues according to this 
Court’s declaratory-judgment precedent, looking 
properly to the existence of a bilateral controversy, 
and not the subjective feelings or perceived 
inhibitions of the plaintiffs alone.  Pet. App. 26a-39a. 
5. In challenging the Federal Circuit’s holding 
that 19 of 20 plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this 
action, petitioners omit any mention of the 
dispositive change in circumstances concerning Dr. 
Ostrer—the lone plaintiff that the Federal Circuit 
held to have standing.  The Federal Circuit’s 
determination that Dr. Ostrer had standing was 
entirely predicated on his employment at NYU.  The 
court found that Myriad’s offer “to [Dr. Ostrer’s] 
institution, NYU Medical Center, [of] a limited 
collaborative license . . . requir[ing] NYU to make a 
payment to Myriad” served as the basis for a 
justiciable controversy.  Pet. App. 32a.  The court 
reasoned that such controversy persisted for over a 
decade because “the relevant circumstances remain 
unchanged.”  Id. at 35a  However, after the Federal 
Circuit issued its opinion, Dr. Ostrer himself 
unilaterally changed those “circumstances” by ending 
his employment at NYU.  See Pltfs’ Answer to Dfts’ 
Pet. for Reh’g at 2.  Instead, Dr. Ostrer is now 
employed at Montefiore, id., an institution with 
which Myriad has never had a controversy, and 
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where petitioners lack even an arguable claim to a 
controversy.  Accordingly, since the Federal Circuit 
issued its opinion, the relevant circumstances have 
materially changed such that even Dr. Ostrer no 
longer has a colorable claim to standing to maintain 
this action.   
6. Contrary to petitioners’ cursory assertions (Pet. 
2, 19-22) unsupported by record citation, neither 
Myriad nor the existence of the challenged patents 
hinder research of BRCA1/2 genes or preclude all 
sequencing of such genes.  The record evidence 
demonstrates otherwise.  In fact, one of the named 
plaintiffs concedes that she “could sequence the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes for purely research 
purposes,” C.A. App. A1305 ¶ 15, and has been doing 
so without impediment, id. at A1304 ¶ 11.  The 
unchallenged facts further demonstrate that 18,000 
researchers have conducted studies on BRCA1/2 
genes, over 8,000 relevant papers have been 
published on BRCA1/2 genes, and over 130 clinical 
trials regarding BRCA1/2 genes have been 
commenced since the inventors disclosed their 
inventions to the public.  Id. at A3643 ¶ 13; A4540-41 
¶ 41-45.  Moreover, the record shows that there are 
multiple laboratories that provide “second opinions” 
regarding BRCA1/2 test results for deleterious 
mutations.  Id. at A3666.  All of these facts accord 
with scholarly articles concluding that the existence 
of such patents does not hinder research.  See, e.g., 
Christopher M. Holman, Trends in Human Gene 
Patent Litigation, 322 SCIENCE 198, 199 (2008); John 
P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and 
Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2003 (2005). 
18 
 
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
There is a panoply of reasons for this Court to deny 
the petition—the correctness of the judgment below, 
the absence of any conflict, 30 years of acceptance 
and reliance by the biotechnology sector, the 
uniqueness of this case, the abstractness of the 
challenge, and the inevitable antecedent 
jurisdictional issues that this Court would have to 
take up in order to reach the merits of the § 101 issue, 
which itself is misrepresented by petitioners as “[a]re 
human genes patentable?” 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION WAS 
CORRECT 
In this case, the Federal Circuit, the appellate 
court vested with the statutory mission of unifying 
and clarifying U.S. patent law, issued a judgment 
that was not only correct, but also consistent with the 
text of the Patent Act, with this Court’s decisions, 
with the considered judgment of the PTO, with 
industry practice, and with every discernible policy 
goal of the Patent Act. 
First, the challenged isolated DNA molecules are 
unquestionably and undisputedly “compositions of 
matter” within the text of § 101.  That section 
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful . . . composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor . . . .”  This language is purposely “expansive” 
and “comprehensive,” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, 
to “ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3225 (2010) (quoting, through Chakrabarty, 5 
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Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75-76 (H. Washington 
ed. 1871)).  
The claimed isolated DNA molecules satisfy the 
statute because they are nucleotides linked to each 
other by a phosphodiester backbone.  Pet. App. 13a, 
45a-46a, 70a-71a; C.A. App. A3493, A3709, A4290, 
A4317-20, A4723-24.  Petitioners have never 
disputed—indeed, they have repeatedly admitted—
that isolated molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid are 
“compositions” of matter under this definition, and 
they do not argue otherwise here.  Pet. App. 43a; C.A. 
App. A6911.  As such, the claimed isolated DNA 
molecules falls squarely within the statutory term 
“composition of matter.”  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3226 (explaining that the term “composition of 
matter” is to be “understood with common usage” and 
citing Chakrabarty). 
Second, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded 
that the claimed isolated molecules are human-made 
“invent[ions]” under § 101.  As Judge Lourie put it, 
human invention takes place when “human 
intervention has given” the claimed invention 
“‘markedly different,’ or ‘distinctive,’ characteristics.”  
Pet. App. 45a (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 
and Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)).  Judge Moore similarly recognized that the 
claimed isolated molecules “are not naturally 
produced without the intervention of man.”  Pet. App. 
75a (Moore, J., concurring-in-part).   
Third, the Federal Circuit correctly upheld the 
composition-of-matter claims in view of the PTO’s 
longstanding practice of issuing such patents, as 
illustrated by its 2001 Utility Guidelines.  As noted 
above, these guidelines reflect the PTO’s considered 
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judgment that the human identification and isolation 
of a particular DNA molecule represents human 
intervention that constitutes a human invention of a 
composition of matter under § 101.  As Judges Lourie 
and Moore each recognized, this Court “has 
repeatedly stated that changes to longstanding 
practice should come from Congress, not the courts.”  
Pet. App. 52a; see also id. at 87a-93a.   
In J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), this Court 
reiterated that § 101 has “broad scope and 
applicability,” and refused to deny patent protection 
to sexually reproduced plants in view of the fact that 
the “PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for 
at least 16 years and there has been no indication 
from either Congress or agencies with expertise that 
such coverage is inconsistent with [the governing 
statutes].”  Id. at 144-45.  In J.E.M., 16 years of 
agency practice and “some 1,800 utility patents for 
plants” led to this conclusion.  Id. at 127.  The 
present case is even stronger, for there has been over 
30 years of uninterrupted agency practice, over 
40,000 DNA-related patents (Pet. App. 53a), and a 
substantial portion of the biotechnology sector of the 
American economy was built in reliance on that 
patent protection.  “‘To change so substantially the 
rules of the game now,’ after more than a century of 
practice, ‘could very well subvert the various balances 
the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous 
patents which have not yet expired and which would 
be affected by our decision.’” Pet. App. 82a-83a 
(Moore, J., concurring-in-part) (quoting Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
739 (2002)).   
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Finally, the Federal Circuit’s holding of patent-
eligibility is consistent with the overall goals of the 
Patent Act, which is to incentivize those who bring 
new, useful inventions forward to the public with a 
limited right to exclude.  The utility of Myriad’s 
inventions has never been questioned, and the record 
reflects that these never-before-isolated DNA 
molecules brought with them substantial new 
utilities, most notably their use as molecular tools 
(e.g., probes or primers) because of their ability to 
target and form stable chemical structures with a 
BRCA DNA sequence from a patient’s tissue samples.  
See, e.g., C.A. App. A3455-57; A3468-72; A4324; 
A4338-43.  By using these newly-created molecular 
tools, a patient can now more accurately learn of her 
genetic predisposition to, e.g., breast cancer, and in 
turn receive a personalized course of medical 
treatment.  Patients no longer have to rely on the 
past and less precise method of determining 
predisposition risk based on family history.  The 
patent laws appropriately rewarded the inventors. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS NOT 
IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF ANY 
OTHER APPELLATE COURT OR OF THIS 
COURT 
The Court of Appeals’ decision is not in conflict 
with any other federal appellate decision, including 
from the Federal Circuit itself, or with any decision of 
this Court.  Nor is any such conflict alleged by 
petitioners.  Indeed, the word “conflict” appears 
nowhere in the petition. 
What petitioners do claim, however, is that the 
Federal Circuit’s decision “violates long-established 
Supreme Court precedent that prohibits the 
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patenting of laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
products of nature, and abstract ideas.”  Pet. 25.  In 
particular, petitioners allege that “the Federal 
Circuit departed dramatically from Chakrabarty, 
Funk Brothers, and American Fruit Growers.”  Id.  
There is no departure from precedent here, let alone 
a “dramati[c]” one, and petitioners overstate the 
Federal Circuit’s holding when they say that “the 
opinion of Judge Lourie concluded” that “a claimed 
composition” “become[s] patentable simply because 
there has been a change in its structure.”  Pet. 25-26. 
In the case of each of these three precedents, the 
dispute between the parties is not as to the rule of 
law that emerges from each, but simply in the 
application of that rule to the particular facts of this 
case.  In Chakrabarty, this Court upheld the patent-
eligibility of a bacterium under § 101, because the 
claim was “not to a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of 
human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, 
character and use.’”  447 U.S. at 309-10 (quoting 
Hartranft, 121 U. S. at 615).  The Federal Circuit’s 
decision is in perfect harmony with Chakrabarty, 
because here, too, the isolated molecules claimed by 
the Myriad patents are “a product of human 
ingenuity,” and because of their isolation by human 
inventors, the molecules have been given new 
characteristics from the “native” gene embedded in 
the genome, and substantial new utilities as 
diagnostic tools.  Pet. App. 52a (“isolating genes to 
provide useful diagnostic tools and medicines is 
surely what the patent laws are intended to 
encourage and protect”). 
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Chakrabarty quoted language from Funk Brothers 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), 
which was a “case decided on obviousness.”  Pet. App. 
44a.  In Funk Brothers, the patent claimed “[a]n 
inoculant for leguminous plants” made up of “a 
plurality of selected . . . strains of different species of 
bacteria of the genus Rhizobium.”  333 U.S. at 128 
n.1.  The Court concluded that this claim, which 
called simply for mixing two or more known strains of 
bacteria, created no new invention (in the words of 
the present-day 1952 Patent Act, the combination 
was “obvious”) because the bacteria mixed together 
worked the same way as when administered to plants 
separately.  Id. at 131; see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 310 (contrasting Chakrabarty’s new, human-made 
bacterium with Funk’s mixtures of old, known 
bacteria).  Here, isolated DNA molecules present a 
different case than in Funk Brothers, not only 
because no obviousness claim is asserted, but also 
because the claimed isolated DNA molecules do take 
on different properties and utilities upon their 
isolation from the chromosome, and those differences 
are directly dependent upon the intervention of 
human inventors.  Pet. App. 45a-49a; Pet. App. 70a-
73a (Moore, J., concurring-in-part). 
Finally, in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. 
Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931), this Court concluded 
that the addition of a small amount of borax to the 
rind of a fresh orange did not meet the statutory 
definition of a “manufacture”—a question not 
presented here—because the dictionary definition of 
that term required the creation of “an article for use 
which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property,” id. at 11, and the orange in question was, 
in the Court’s view, unchanged by the addition of 
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borax as a preservative:  “It remains a fresh orange, 
fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.”  
Id. at 12.  Here, by contrast, there is no dispute that 
these isolated molecules satisfy the statutory 
definition of “composition of matter,” Pet. App. 43a, 
and the inventors of these isolated molecules of 
DNA—unlike the person who coated a fresh orange 
with borax—created a previously unknown and 
unavailable resource for doctors and scientists, with 
great diagnostic utility for patients. 
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s decision was a 
faithful application of this Court’s precedents, all of 
which recognize that where human intervention 
brings about a new and useful composition of matter 
for the public good, that meets § 101’s “broad,” 
“expansive,” and “comprehensive” standard of patent 
eligibility. 
III. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE UNIQUE 
TO THIS CASE, FACTBOUND, AND 
UNLIKELY TO RECUR 
Since the PTO first issued a patent drawn to an 
isolated DNA molecule in 1984, no appellate case—
until this one—challenged the patent-eligibility of 
such claims under § 101.  The absence of such 
challenges is not for want of opportunities, however:  
“[C]laims similar to the ones at issue in this case 
have been the focal point of important litigation.”  Pet. 
App. 81a (Moore, J., concurring-in-part) (citing 
Amgen, 927 F.2d 1200).  In Amgen, for example, the 
isolated-DNA-molecule claims at issue were 
challenged principally on grounds of prior invention 
(see 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)), obviousness (id. § 103), 
failure to set forth the best mode (id. § 112), non-
enablement (id.), and inequitable conduct.  See 
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Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205-15.  While ineligibility 
under § 101 was apparently pled as an affirmative 
defense, see id. at 1204, it was not the subject of any 
appellate decision.  Nor has any other appellate 
decision since the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act 
struck down any kind of composition-of-matter claim 
as ineligible for patenting under § 101.  And it is 
doubtful that § 101 will ever need to be litigated in 
this area in the future, because the complete human 
genome was published in 2001.  This development 
will make it exceedingly unlikely that new claims to 
such isolated human DNA molecules will arise.  See 
Robert S. Schwartz, Genes for Free: The Effect of 
Publication of the Human Genome on the 
Patentability of Genes and Gene-Based Inventions, 
23 PACE L. REV. 731, 745 (2003); Holman, 322 
SCIENCE at 198-99 (noting in 2008 that “the number 
of human gene patent litigations pending at any 
given point in time has fallen off in recent years,” 
that “[t]his decline corresponds to reports of a similar 
marked decline in the filing and issuance of DNA 
patents in the United States since 2001”, and 
concluding that “fears expressed concerning human 
gene patents have not been manifested overtly in 
litigation”).  Further, most gene-related patents filed 
before the 2001 publication of the human genome will 
soon expire.  Thus, the unique nature of this case 
makes it a singularly inappropriate candidate for 
certiorari. 
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals’ opinions 
implicitly recognize, proper resolution of this case 
requires consideration of an extensive welter of 
underlying scientific facts.  While all parties agreed 
that petitioners’ § 101 challenge presented a question 
of law, the summary-judgment record created at the 
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district court demonstrates that this question of law 
is informed by important underlying scientific facts, 
and in this record, prominent scientists and other 
experts have viewed the human inventive 
contribution to the claimed inventions quite 
differently than petitioners now suggest.  See, e.g., 
C.A. App. A4320-33 ¶¶ 131-54 (detailing inventive 
contributions provided by inventors and the 
challenged claims); id. at A4410-12 ¶¶ 44-48 
(explaining same).  Moreover, the record reflects 
declarations from experts regarding the benefit of 
such patents to the public.  Id. at A4543-44, A4546 
¶¶ 50-56, 60-62 (declaration of Dr. Philip Reilly 
explaining how challenged patents have accelerated 
further innovation and research); A4729 ¶ 31 
(declaration of Dr. Schlessinger explaining 
importance of patents to medical innovation).  The 
factbound nature of this inquiry presents an 
additional reason to deny certiorari.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) (“We do 
not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss 
specific facts.”). 
IV. THIS CASE PRESENTS A POOR VEHICLE 
FOR THIS COURT’S REVIEW 
In addition to all of these other reasons for denying 
certiorari, a series of vehicular problems with this 
case counsels against this Court’s review. 
First, as noted above, the petition is encumbered 
by a set of antecedent jurisdictional problems.  
Petitioners themselves have highlighted one of these 
problems—affecting 19 of the 20 plaintiff-
petitioners—by asking for review of the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling as to these 19 
petitioners.  Of course, their request for review 
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alleges no conflict with respect to this jurisdictional 
issue, and offers no explanation why this Court 
should take up that issue, when one of the 20 
petitioners was held to have a sufficient dispute with 
Myriad to sustain this declaratory-judgment action. 
The apparent reason that petitioners seek review 
on this jurisdictional issue, however, is because even 
the one petitioner held by the Federal Circuit to have 
standing—Dr. Ostrer—in fact has no sufficiently live 
case-or-controversy with Myriad to sustain 
jurisdiction under Article III.  The “case-or-
controversy requirement subsists through all stages 
of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.  
To sustain our jurisdiction … it is not enough that a 
dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or 
when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals.”  
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-
78 (1990).  Here, substantial questions regarding Dr. 
Ostrer’s stake (if any) in this case would also have to 
be resolved at the outset, before the Court could 
reach the merits of the § 101 issue. 
Consistent with this Court’s precedent that a 
justiciable controversy must be real and immediate—
rather than imagined—and must be between adverse 
parties—rather than one-sided—the Federal Circuit 
unanimously and correctly held that seventeen 
named plaintiffs lacked standing given the absence of 
any “affirmative acts by [Myriad] directed at specific 
Plaintiffs.”  Pet. App. 38a-39a.  Two additional 
plaintiffs (Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly) lacked 
standing because they had no active commitment to 
engaging in any testing even if the claims were 
invalidated.  Pet. App. 30a-32a. 
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Applying the same principle to the present 
circumstances demonstrates that this case is now 
moot because of Dr. Ostrer’s change in employment.  
Importantly, the Federal Circuit rooted its finding 
that Dr. Ostrer had standing based on a controversy 
stemming from a collaborative license offer that 
Myriad made to NYU in 1998 that would “require[] 
NYU to make a payment to Myriad” for certain 
BRCA1/2 testing performed by an NYU laboratory at 
which Dr. Ostrer was formerly employed.  Id. at 32a-
34a.  Myriad, however, has never had any 
controversy with Montefiore, Dr. Ostrer’s current 
employer; indeed, the record reflects no Myriad 
communication with Montefiore, no actions directed 
to Montefiore by Myriad, and no awareness by 
Myriad of any actions being taken by Montefiore.  
And, any controversy created by Myriad’s 1998 offer 
of a collaborative license to NYU cannot follow Dr. 
Ostrer to his employment at an entirely different 
institution, Montefiore.  Indeed, assuming NYU had 
signed the offered collaborative license with Myriad 
in 1998, see Pet. App. 31a-32a, those license rights 
would not have followed Dr. Ostrer to Montefiore; 
rather, such rights would have remained with NYU.  
These jurisdictional deficiencies thus render this case 
a poor vehicle for resolving the questions presented. 
Second, even aside from the correctness vel non of 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional decision, the 
posture of this case—a declaratory-judgment action 
mounted by 20 recruited plaintiffs—makes this case 
a poor vehicle.  This case is an abstract challenge 
seeking an advisory opinion.  The particular patent 
claims put at issue were selected for a § 101 
challenge by petitioners alone.  Yet petitioners did 
not contest all of the claims of Myriad’s challenged 
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patents.  Specifically, petitioners left unchallenged 
several claims (e.g., to primers and probes) which 
petitioners concede will continue to impede 
sequencing and other conduct in which they seek to 
engage: “Myriad has obtained patents on DNA as 
probes.  Claim 6 of ‘473 is one example and not 
challenged here.”  Plfs’ C.A. Br. at 16; see also C.A. 
App. A432-23; A6973 ¶ 40; A7021.  Accordingly, there 
exist significant issues of redressability, yet another 
antecedent jurisdictional problem with this petition.  
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561 (1992) (explaining that standing requires that “it 
must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision’”). 
Moreover, Myriad did not assert counterclaims of 
infringement against any of these plaintiff-
petitioners, because Myriad had no basis to believe 
that any of them were engaged in, or likely to engage 
in, infringing behavior.  This is particularly 
important, because much of petitioners’ effort to 
obtain this Court’s review is premised upon such 
disputable speculation as “patents on genes . . . 
preven[t] advances in science and medicine that could 
result in better diagnosis and treatment” (Pet. 20), 
“[t]he patents give Myriad the authority to prevent 
all research and clinical testing of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes” (Pet. 21), “claims like 5 and 6 of 
patent ‘282 preempt researchers from working with 
that segment of DNA, wherever it may appear in the 
genome” (Pet. 29-30), and “[p]atents on isolated 
DNA . . . block scientific inquiry into the patented 
DNA.”  Pet. 30.  These assertions are just that—
assertions—but they have not been tested in the 
crucible of litigation, let alone demonstrated to be 
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true in this case, because Myriad did not assert its 
patents against any petitioner, and so the lower 
courts had no reason to determine the precise scope 
of the patents’ exclusionary rights.  Indeed, after 
analyzing this issue, one commentator concluded that 
“properly interpreted these claims likely would not 
have the broad preclusive effect attributed to them by 
the critics.”  Christopher M. Holman, Gene Patents 
Under Fire: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE PATENT LAW 260, 287 
(Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini eds., 2011). 
In any event, the record belies petitioners’ 
sweeping claims, showing that over 18,000 
researchers have conducted studies on the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 molecules, resulting in the publication of 
over 8,000 scientific papers.  C.A. App. at A3439-40; 
A3444; A3484-87; see also Holman, supra, 322 
SCIENCE at 199.  That is hardly a “block[age of] 
scientific inquiry.”  If this case did present an 
important and recurring issue—which it does not—it 
would be better for this Court to await another such 
case, where the patent owner has actually asserted 
the exclusionary force of its patents, so that this 
Court can properly evaluate the “preemptive” force of 
those patent claims instead of relying on bald and 
dubious assertions such as those put forth by the 
petitioners here. 
Third, petitioners themselves suggest that this 
Court will have to address questions of patent claim 
construction in order to properly analyze the patent-
eligibility issues.  See Pet. 28 (asserting that the 
“mode of analysis” set forth in Judge Lourie’s opinion 
“contradicts both the patent claim language . . . and 
this Court’s repeated admonition that patents should 
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be evaluated according to the actual claim language”).  
This is yet another antecedent problem, neither 
mentioned nor even fairly included within the 
questions presented, that makes this case a poor 
vehicle for this Court’s review. 
Fourth, while petitioners claim that “[t]his case is 
an ideal vehicle to analyze the Section 101 question” 
because their “sole claim under the Patent Act” was 
brought under § 101 (Pet. 20), in truth this fact 
renders this case a poor vehicle, not an ideal one.  
Any consideration of the proper role of § 101 
necessarily requires a proper understanding of 
whether, or how, other provisions of the Patent Act 
might apply to those claims.  Section 101, in fact, 
concludes with the proviso that its broad, inclusive 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter are 
“subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”  As this Court and the Federal Circuit have 
repeatedly held, § 101 is an overly blunt tool for 
sifting inventions that should be allowed patents 
from those that should not be patented. See, e.g., 
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 
859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Patent Act provides 
powerful tools to weed out claims that may present a 
vague or indefinite disclosure of the invention. Thus, 
a patent that presents a process sufficient to pass the 
coarse eligibility filter may nonetheless be invalid.”); 
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 
F.3d 1057, 1066-68 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (same); see 
generally Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (same). 
The much finer and better-calibrated filters 
provided by § 102’s novelty requirement and § 103’s 
non-obviousness requirement, to name just two, take 
into account such important, case-and-technology-
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specific factors as the level of ordinary skill in the 
particular art, the knowledge of the ordinary artisan 
at the time of invention, the expectations of others in 
the art, and so on.  See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere & 
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2007).  By contrast, without the 
presence of claims or defenses under §§ 102 and 103, 
the courts in this case have been asked to make 
largely abstract, policy-based pronouncements, 
untethered to statutory text, about what sorts of 
inventions should be allowed to pass through the first, 
“coarse” filter of § 101.  If there were a serious and 
recurring issue worthy of this Court’s consideration 
buried here, it would be better considered in a case 
that also allows for consideration of these other 
“conditions and requirements of this title,” and their 
interplay with § 101. 
Fifth, it bears repeating that, as to the Federal 
Circuit’s holding with respect to the composition-of-
matter claims being challenged here, there is only a 
judgment, not a single opinion for the court.  Pet. 16-
18; see Pet. App. 62a, 67a (Moore, J., concurring-in-
part).  Petitioners seek to make this a reason for this 
Court’s review.  Pet. 16-19.  But, had there been a 
true need to reconcile these divergent judicial 
viewpoints, it would have been appropriate for 
petitioners to first seek en banc review from the 
Federal Circuit before approaching this Court.  For 
whatever reasons, though, they did not.  This is 
particularly important for cases coming from the 
Federal Circuit, because that court’s statutory 
mission is to unify national law with respect to 
patents (and other subjects within its jurisdiction), as 
this Court has long recognized.  See, e.g., Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3231 (encouraging “the Federal Circuit’s 
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development of other limiting criteria that further 
the purposes of the Patent Act and are not 
inconsistent with its text”); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“It was 
just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that 
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for 
patent cases, H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981), 
observing that increased uniformity would 
‘strengthen the United States patent system in such 
a way as to foster technological growth and industrial 
innovation.”’).  Again, were there a serious and 
recurring issue worthy of this Court’s consideration, 
it would be better addressed in a case where the 
Federal Circuit has had, or has taken, the 
opportunity to exercise its statutory mission by 
considering the issues en banc.  See, e.g., Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3224-25; Festo, 535 U.S. at 729-30; Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 
23-24 (1997); Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
Finally, it is clear that petitioners seek, via judicial 
ruling, a policy change from the longstanding 
practice of allowing patents on isolated genetic 
molecules.  See Pet. 20.  Such efforts at changing 
national policy, particularly policy that has 
engendered such reliance and investment over the 
past 30 years, should be addressed to Congress, not 
to the courts.  Pet. App. 53a; id. at 88a-93a (Moore, J., 
concurring-in-part).  As this Court has long 
admonished, courts “should not read into the patent 
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature 
has not expressed.”  United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). 
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Only Congress is equipped with the ability to make 
judgments about whether the benefits of such patents 
outweigh any claimed detrimental impact on society.  
Yet petitioners ask this Court to undertake exactly 
that sort of exercise, on a judicial record where 
Myriad’s experts have refuted each and every one of 
the petitioners’ allegations on the subject.  See Pet. 2, 
5, 19-22.  As noted above, for example, Myriad’s 
patents have not impeded over 8,000 research 
articles by over 18,000 authors (including 35 articles 
authored by four of the petitioners).  C.A. App. 
A3643-44.  Myriad’s patented work has made genetic 
testing widely available to patients in all 50 states at 
an affordable cost to patients where 90% of Myriad’s 
testing is covered insurance with a weighted average 
out-of-pocket expense for such tests at under $100.  
Decl. of Dr. Gregory C. Critchfield at 6-7, Dec. 18, 
2009, ECF No. 158.  More than 40,000 healthcare 
providers have used Myriad’s testing and more than 
2,600 insurance payors have reimbursed for testing 
under more than 80,000 insurance plans.  Id. at 12, 
15-16.  Contrary to petitioners’ insinuation (Pet. 22), 
second-opinion testing to confirm deleterious 
mutations is available at multiple laboratories.  C.A. 
App. A3666.  Even the district court recognized that 
resolution of “these disputes of fact and policy are not 
possible within the context of these motions.”  Pet. 
App. 170a, 178a. 
Moreover, any consideration of these issues will 
need to take into account the consequences of a legal 
rule far beyond the realm of human DNA.  Many 
biotechnology companies’ intellectual-property 
protection depends on patents covering isolated DNA 
corresponding to non-human genes, such as in the 
food, pulp and paper, detergents, and biofuels 
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industries.  Advancements in these areas allow 
beverages to be clarified, food starches to be broken 
down, paper to be recycled, clothes to be cleaner and 
softer, and agricultural waste to be reduced to fuel.  
This is the role of policymaking, not adjudication, and 
this Court is “without competence to entertain these 
arguments—either to brush them aside as fantasies 
generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them.  
[They are] matter[s] of high policy for resolution 
within the legislative process after the kind of 
investigation, examination, and study that legislative 
bodies can provide and courts cannot.  That process 
involves the balancing of competing values and 
interests, which in our democratic system is the 
business of elected representatives.”  Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 317. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition should be denied. 
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